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HOW CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS KILLED THE
DRAFT: THE COLLAPSE OF THE SELECTIVE
SERVICE DURING THE VIETNAM WAR
BILL RALEY*

ABSTRACT
This Article argues that a key-but-overlooked factor in the Vietnam-era breakdown
of the draft system was the Supreme Court’s expansion of the religious conscientious
objector (“CO”) exemption. It asserts that the Court understood that the CO exemption
violated the Establishment Clause, but rather than strike the exemption down, the
Court avoided the constitutional issue by interpreting away the religious element of
CO statutes. The Article concludes that the Court’s rulings caused CO exemptions to
skyrocket, which in turn caused the draft system to collapse toward the end of the
Vietnam War.
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INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most profound legacy of the Vietnam War was the demise of the draft.
Today’s all-volunteer force is, in the words of former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, “a clear
result of the Vietnam war.”1 The conventional wisdom is that the brutality and
unpopularity of that war created “tremendous pressure to end the draft at almost any
price.”2 But the assumption that Vietnam was “a different kind of war”3 that provoked
a different kind of backlash overlooks the fact that Vietnam was not America’s first
(or even most) brutal and unpopular war,4 and that the draft has always been a source
of serious civil unrest.5 This raises the question: what was it about Vietnam that pushed
the draft past its breaking point?
This Article argues that a key, but overlooked, factor in the Vietnam-era
breakdown of the draft system was the Supreme Court’s expansion of the religious
conscientious objector (“CO”) exemption. It asserts that the Court knew that the CO
exemption violated the Establishment Clause, but rather than strike it down, the Court
avoided the issue by interpreting away the religious element of CO statutes. The
Article concludes that the Court’s rulings caused CO exemptions to skyrocket, which
in turn caused the draft system to collapse towards the end of the Vietnam War.
Part I of this Article describes the historical evolution of both the CO exemption
and Establishment Clause jurisprudence, showing that by the Vietnam War era, the
CO exemption rested on very shaky constitutional grounds. Part II analyzes the CO
exemption cases that reached the Court during the Vietnam War, and how the Court’s
decision to broaden the statutory definition of religion, rather than declare the
exemption unconstitutional, fatally undermined the draft system. Part III addresses the
postwar legacy of the Court’s CO exemption cases, showing that they were cited by
President Ford’s controversial presidential clemency board as justification for liberally
offering pardons to draft evaders who cited matters of conscience as their motive. Part
IV concludes that, if the draft is ever reinstated, the CO exemption will have to be
abolished.

1 BERNARD ROSTKER, I WANT YOU! THE EVOLUTION OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 15 n.3
(2006).
2

Id.

3 “A Different Kind of War” was the title of a major study about the Johnson Administration’s
actions during its escalation of the Vietnam War. GEORGE C. HERRING, LBJ AND VIETNAM: A
DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR (1994).
4 In regard to brutality, more U.S. soldiers were killed in the trenches of WWI in just a yearand-a-half than in the jungles of Vietnam over two decades. The horrors of WWI and lack of
support for U.S. involvement are reflected by the fact that more fighting-age men unlawfully
evaded the draft than were actually conscripted. Jeanette Keith, The Politics of Southern Draft
Resistance, 1917-1918: Class, Race, and Conscription in the Rural South, 87 J. AM. HIST. 1335,
1336 (2001).
5 For example, the first federal draft, implemented during the Civil War, provoked the New
York City Draft Riots, which remains “the largest civil insurrection in American history apart
from the South’s rebellion itself.” ERIC FONER, THE NEW AMERICAN HISTORY 95 (1997).
Resistance to the draft during WWI drove Congress to pass the Espionage Act of 1917, which
marked the beginning of the domestic surveillance state. PAUL JOSEPH, THE SAGE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WAR: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 521–22 (2016).
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTION
This Part provides a historical overview of the CO exemption leading up to the
Vietnam War era. It shows that the CO exemption was conceived as an
accommodation of pacifists by colonies and early states, and posed no constitutional
problems at its inception. But when Congress enacted the first federal CO exemption
at the behest of peace churches during the Civil War, this exemption likely violated
the Establishment Clause. Congress again included CO exemptions in conscription
bills passed during WWI, WWII, and the Korean War, and these exemptions were also
constitutionally-suspect. This Part concludes that by the beginning of the Vietnam
War, the inherent constitutional problems posed by the CO exemption had not been
confronted nor resolved.

A. Origin and Early Development of the CO Exemption
The practice of exempting conscientious objectors from conscription dates back to
the earliest years of British colonization of North America. At that time, the colonies
relied on the local militia system for defense against Native Americans and rival
colonial powers, and each colony, except Quaker Pennsylvania, required every ablebodied male property owner to serve in the militia. 6 Pacifist Protestants began
immigrating to the colonies in large numbers in the second half of the seventeenth
century, and immediately ran into trouble with the law when they refused to perform
their militia duties.7
The pacifists were initially subjected to fines, jail sentences, and property
confiscation for violating conscription laws, but “the leaders of the colonial
governments gradually worked out accommodations with the pacifist religious
communities.”8 The colonial “legislators recognized the economically productive and
otherwise law-abiding nature of the members of these pacifist groups,”9 and also
“came to recognize that many of the religious objectors would rather suffer and die
than take up arms and kill other humans.”10 Faced with competitive pressures to attract
pacifistic but otherwise model minority immigrants, and the fact that efforts to
forcefully integrate them into the militia were believed to be futile,11 “a number of

6 John Whiteclay Chambers II, Conscientious Objectors and the American State from
Colonial Times to the Present, in THE NEW CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION: FROM SACRED TO
SECULAR RESISTANCE 25 (Charles Moskos & John Whiteclay Chambers II eds., 1993).
7

Id.

8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Id. at 26.

11

An interesting historical anecdote occurred during the French and Indian Wars, when the
need for conscripts, coupled with popular resentment of prosperous pacifists’ exemption from
military service, led colonial governments to crack down on conscientious objection. When the
governor of Virginia directed Col. George Washington to put Quakers in stockades and place
them on bread and water rations until they agreed to fight, Washington declined by citing
practical considerations. “I could by no means bring the Quakers to any terms,” he responded,
as “[t]hey choose rather to be whipped to death than bear arms.” Id. at 27.
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colonial legislatures provided exemptions for Quakers, Mennonites, and other
sectarian pacifists who were conscientiously opposed to bearing arms.”12
When the colonies declared independence from Britain, the Revolutionary
legislatures enacted CO exemptions designed to continue the tradition of providing
alternative service for members of the historic peace churches. 13 For example, New
York’s 1777 constitution exempted from military service “the people called Quakers
as, from scruples of conscience, may be averse to the bearing of arms.” 14 During the
Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress (which did not have a direct role in
conscription) passed a resolution recognizing that there were “some people who, from
religious principles, cannot bear arms in any case,” and pled for them to support the
revolution in ways that would not violate their conscience.15
After the Revolutionary War was won and the Bill of Rights was being debated,
James Madison included a CO exemption in the list of provisions he submitted for
House consideration.16 If the provision had passed, the Second Amendment would
have ended with a clause stating: “but no person religiously scrupulous shall be
compelled to bear arms.”17 In a fascinating debate, Congress argued over how and
whether to include this “indulgence” of “the Quakers,” as such an accommodation
could lead to undue federal interference with state militias. 18
For the purposes of this Article, Pennsylvania Rep. Thomas Scott contributed the
most interesting argument during the debate over a constitutional CO exemption. Scott
made a prediction that was startlingly prescient of what would come to pass nearly
two centuries later during the Vietnam War, when secular and religiously-jaded
Americans began citing vague New Age beliefs in claiming the CO exemption. “It has
been urged that religion is on the decline,” Scott observed. “[I]f so, the argument is
more strong in my favor, for when the time comes that religion shall be discarded, the
12

Id. at 26.

13 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 170 (1965) (noting that CO exemptions were
“perpetuated in state statutes and constitutions” after the Revolution).
14

N.Y. CONST. art XL (1777).

15

CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, JOURNALS OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS: FROM 1774 TO 1788: IN
FOUR VOLUMES 119 § I (Way & Gideon 1823). The resolution went on to state that “this
Congress intends no violence to their consciences,” but then went on to “earnestly recommend”
that they “contribute liberally in th[at] time of universal calamity, to the relief of their distressed
brethren in the several colonies.” Id. This “earnest recommendation” was aimed at Quakers who
controversially refused to hire substitute soldiers or pay war fines.
16

Ellis M. West, The Right to Religion-Based Exemptions in Early America: The Case of
Conscientious Objectors to Conscription, 10 J. L. & RELIG. 367, 395 (1993-94).
17

Id.

New York Rep. Egbert Benson, for example, stated that “[h]e would always leave it to the
benevolence of the Legislature, for, modify it as you please, it will be impossible to express it
in such a manner as to clear it from ambiguity. No man can claim this indulgence of right. It
may be a religious persuasion, but it is no natural right, and therefore ought to be left to the
discretion of the Government. If this stands part of the constitution, it will be a question before
the Judiciary on every regulation you make with respect to the organization of the militia,
whether it comports with this declaration or not. It is extremely injudicious to intermix matters
of doubt with fundamentals.” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 751 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) [hereinafter
Gales].
18
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generality of persons will have recourse to these pretexts to get excused from bearing
arms.”19
Madison’s CO exemption survived the first round of congressional debate, but
went on to die in a committee, which excised it without explanation. Though they did
not mention exemption from bearing arms specifically, several House drafts of what
would go on to become the First Amendment also included provisions against
“infringe[ments]” on “rights of conscience.”20 These provisions were also rejected,
this time by the Senate, and unfortunately “[n]o record of the Senate debate
survives.”21
In concluding our discussion of early CO exemptions, it is important to note that
the colonial and post-Revolution legislatures granted the exemptions “for practical as
well as philosophical reasons,”22 and that they largely considered CO exemptions an
“indulgence” of eccentric sects rather than a free exercise right.23 It is also important
to emphasize that, even after the passage of the First Amendment, these early state
laws “respecting the establishment of religion” did not pose any constitutional
problems. As originally conceived and interpreted, the First Amendment applied only
to Congress, and was actually designed to permit states to continuing regulating
religion (for example, by exempting Quakers and other sects from conscription)
without interference from the new federal government.24

B. The Civil War and the First Federal CO Exemption
In 1863, mid-way through the Civil War, Congress implemented the first federal
draft in U.S. history.25 The Enrollment Act (also known as the Civil War Military Draft
Act) resurrected Revolutionary War-era penalty fee and hired substitution exemptions,
but it did not contain an CO exemption.26 This surprised the Quakers, as they had been
“diligently lobbying Congress and knew that Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton and
President Lincoln”—both of whom were from Quaker backgrounds—“were both
known to be sympathetic to their cause.”27
The “Quakers were determined to acquire a legal guarantee against conscription,”
as they continued to oppose (as they had during the Revolutionary War) indirect
support of war through exemption fees or the provision of substitute conscripts. 28 They
19

Id. at 767.

20

Id. at 766.

21

JOHN WITTE & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION
EXPERIMENT 80 (4th ed. 2016).
22

Chambers, supra note 7, at 26 (emphasis added).

23

West, supra note 16, at 377.

AND THE

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

The First Amendment’s religion clauses were made applicable to the states only after the
Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the clauses in Everson v. Bd.
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
24

25

ROSTKER, supra note 1, at 22.

26

Enrollment Act, ch. 75, sec. 18, 12 Stat. 731, 783 (1863).

27

Tara J. Carnahan, The Quakers and Conscientious Objection, 20 HISTORIA 1, 7 (2011).

28

Id.
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quickly “organized a committee that traveled to Washington” to lobby for a CO
exemption.29 Their efforts paid off, as Congress amended the Enrollment Act in
February 1864 to include the following alternative-service exemption: “members of
religious denominations conscientiously opposed to the bearing of arms, and who are
prohibited from doing so by the rules and articles of faith and practice of said religious
denomination, shall, when drafted into the military service, be considered noncombatants.”30
A compelling case can be made that this first federal CO exemption violated the
First Amendment. It was passed as a direct result of lobbying by an established
religious group and tailor-made to cover only them, so it is hard to see it as anything
other than a “law respecting an establishment of religion.”31 But because the
exemption was passed near the end of the Civil War, no constitutional challenge
reached the Supreme Court before the conflict ended.

C. Reynolds and Religious Exemptions
When Congress passed the constitutionally-questionable federal CO exemption in
1864, constitutional jurisprudence regarding religion was entirely undeveloped. It
would be fifteen more years before the Supreme Court decided its first case involving
the First Amendment’s religion clauses.32 That case, Reynolds v. United States,33
concluded that the Free Exercise clause does not provide conscience-based
exemptions from legal duties.
In Reynolds, a Mormon living in the Utah Territory was charged with violating a
congressional criminal statute that prohibited polygamy in federal territories.34 The
defendant argued that polygamy was a matter of religious duty for Mormons, 35 and
that the Constitution provided Mormons with a free exercise exemption from
compliance with the statute.36 The Court rejected this argument by adopting a
Jeffersonian interpretation of the First Amendment,37 holding that “Congress was
29

Id. at 7–8.

30

Enrollment Act, ch. 13, sec. 17, 13 Stat. 6, 9 (1864).

31

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

32

See Harrop A. Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PENN. L. REV. 806, 822
(1958) (stating that Reynolds was “the first case to consider the free exercise clause”); infra
note 65 and accompanying text (stating that the Supreme Court’s first Establishment Clause
case was heard in the late 1940s).
33

98 U.S. 145 (1878).

34

Id. at 161.

The plaintiff explained “that the failing or refusing to practise polygamy by such male
members of said church, when circumstances would admit, would be punished, and that the
penalty for such failure and refusal would be damnation in the life to come.” Id. at 161.
35

36

Id. at 166.

The Court began its analysis by noting that “[t]he word ‘religion’ is not defined in the
Constitution,” and that it must “go elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its meaning.” The Court
then turned to Jefferson, “an acknowledged leader of the advocates of the [First Amendment],”
to determine what “religion” meant. The Court relied chiefly on the Virginia Statute for
Religious Freedom and the famous letter to the Danbury Baptist Association to determine how
Jefferson conceived of “religion” and religious freedom. The Court began by noting that early
37
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deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions
which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.” 38
To provide legal exemptions based on religious belief, the Court warned, “would
be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land,
and, in effect, to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could
exist only in name under such circumstances.”39 Quoting with approval Jefferson’s
Danbury Baptist letter, the Court acknowledged “the rights of conscience” as being
among man’s “natural rights,” but then qualified that “he has no natural right in
opposition to his social duties.”40
The Reynolds holding had serious implications for federal CO exemptions. In fact,
since Reynolds concluded that “Congress was deprived of all legislative power over
mere opinion”41 by the First Amendment, it could be argued that any exemption based
on a conscientious belief, whether sacred or secular in origin, constitutes a violation
of the Establishment Clause.42

D. WWI Draft Law and the Selective Draft Law Cases
When Congress began debating reinstating the draft during WWI, “church leaders
and political activists descended on Washington to advocate for provisions for those
who rejected war on religious grounds.”43 The Reynolds case should have given
states forced citizens to subsidize religions “whose tenets they could not and did not subscribe,”
and punished people for “entertaining heretical opinions.” This was the evil that Jefferson set
out to cure through the Virginia Statute of Freedom and the First Amendment. The Court first
cited the Virginia Statute of Freedom’s recital, which states that “to suffer the civil magistrate
to intrude his powers into the field of opinion” would “destroy[] all religious liberty.” The Court
then cited the Danbury Baptist letter as evidence of Jefferson’s understanding of the First
Amendment, in which Jefferson wrote that “religion is a matter which lies solely between man
and his God; . . . [and] that the legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not
opinions.” Id. at 162-64 (emphasis added).
38

Id. at 164.

39

Id. at 167.

40

Id. at 164.

41

Id.

Since Reynolds defines religion as “mere opinion” regarding morality, it could be argued
that “Congress shall make no law respecting” subjective moral beliefs, whether based on
religious principles or secular philosophy. The conclusion that Congress must stay neutral when
it comes to moral controversies of any type is supported by Jefferson’s 1818 report discussing
the University of Virginia’s original curriculum. In that report, Jefferson wrote that in order to
maintain “conformity with the principles of our constitution,” “we have proposed no professor
of Divinity,” and even secular courses of ethical lectures may develop only “[those] moral
obligations . . . in which all sects agree.” THOMAS JEFFERSON, REPORT OF THE BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA TO THE VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY
(1818).
42

43

CHRISTOPHER CAPOZZOLA, UNCLE SAM WANTS YOU: WORLD WAR I AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICAN CITIZEN 58 (2008). The Washington Post colorfully described a
meeting between leaders of the Hutterites, a historic peace church, and the Secretary of War as
being “the most numerous collection of whiskers the War Department has seen in many a day.”
Id.
THE
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Congress pause about the constitutionality of CO exemptions. Washington, however,
was “so distracted by the larger issues of war mobilization that it had little time to
devote to the CO question.”44
As during the Civil War, the peace churches again “got most of what they wanted,”
and a CO exemption was added to the WWI conscription act.45 Congress, being aware
that “[e]ven the perception of certain groups being favored could produce a fair
amount of backlash among the general public,” carefully crafted the exemption to limit
it to the historic peace churches.46 The Act exempted only members of a “wellrecognized religious sect or organization at present organized and existing and whose
existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form.”47
The WWI conscription act was immediately challenged as unconstitutional. In
January 1918, less than a year after Congress enacted the Selective Services Act, the
Supreme Court upheld it against a number of constitutional challenges.48 Among these
challenges were a claim that the CO exemption was “repugnant to the First
Amendment” as “an establishment of a religion or an interference with the free
exercise thereof . . . .”49
The case was decided “at an early stage in the development of First Amendment
doctrine;”50 decades before the Court would declare the First Amendment to be
incorporated by the Fourteenth and subsequently embark on long, tortuous
jurisprudential journey to map the boundaries of the First Amendment 51 (a journey
that continues to this day). The 1918 Court, therefore, may have held a simplistic view
of the First Amendment, and simply assumed that the nation’s long tradition of
granting an exemption to religious objectors was ipso facto evidence that the
exemption was compatible with the Constitution. In any case, the Court devoted only
a single sentence to the CO exemption challenge, dismissively brushing the claim
aside by stating “we think its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do more.”52

E. WWII Draft Law and the Kauten and Berman Cases
On the eve of U.S. entry into WWII, Congress began drafting the BurkeWadsworth conscription bill, which “contained many features of the Selective Service
44

Id.

45

Id.

46 NICHOLAS A. KREHBIEL, PROTECTOR OF CONSCIENCE, PROPONENT OF SERVICE: GENERAL
LEWIS B. HERSHEY AND ALTERNATIVE SERVICE DURING WORLD WAR II 84 (2009). See also
JEAN-FRANÇOIS CARON, DISOBEDIENCE IN THE MILITARY 34 (2018) (“The use of the words
‘well-recognized religious sects or organizations’ actually restricted the exemption only to the
historic peace churches.”)
47

Select Service Act, ch. 15, sec 4, 40 Stat. 76, 78 (1917) (emphasis added).

48

See generally Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).

49

Id. at 390.

50

Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 n.17 (1971).

51 See Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 725, 725 (2006) (“It is by now axiomatic that the Supreme Court’s Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is a mess—both hopelessly confused and deeply contradictory.”).
52

Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 390.
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System which persisted through the Vietnam era.”53 Just as they did during the Civil
War and WWI, leaders of the historic peace churches came forward to lobby Congress
to include a CO exemption to the draft.54 But unlike during past wars, other types of
pacifists also came forward to ask that a more liberal conscientious objector clause be
included.55
In addition to leaders of the historic peace churches, representatives of Catholic,
Methodist, and Adventist groups, along with the ACLU, proposed their own versions
of a CO exemption.56 The latter groups all proposed exemptions based on the
individual conscience of the objector, not based on the objector’s membership in a
church that promotes pacifism.57 Rejecting the more secular proposals, the House
adopted almost “verbatim” the proposal put forth by the Quakers, which exempted
one “who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to
participation in war in any form.”58
It is difficult to determine what exactly Congress intended by adopting this
language, as the congressional debate was sparse and does not indicate a consensus
one way or the other. “The Committee Reports are entirely silent on the subject,” and
even the statutory language itself “did not originate with Members of Congress” but
was rather “language proposed by the Quakers.”59 It seems quite likely that Congress
intended to perpetuate the centuries-old status quo and, in a rush to move on to other
matters, simply adopted the proposal put forth by the most venerable of the peace
churches which, by its reference to “religious training,” appeared limited to members
of churches with pacifistic doctrines.
The opacity of Congress’s objectives, coupled with the statute’s “vague language,”
“permitted differing court interpretations of its scope.”60 In United States v. Kauten,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held, without citing any evidence of
congressional intent, that:

53 Richard P. Fox, Conscientious Objection to War: The Background and a Current Appraisal,
31 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 77, 81 (1982).
54

Donald Eugene Houston, The Legislative History of the Burke-Wadsworth Act of 1940 39
(August 1969) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Oklahoma State University) (“Traditionally pacifist
groups, or advocates of non-combatant service, such as the Quakers, the Mennonites, and the
Seventh Day Adventists appeared and repeated their requests for exemptions.”).
Id. at 93 (“The pacifists—both individuals and religious groups—contended that
compulsory service as here proposed violated the conscience of those who were not members
of historically pacifist groups. Adequate provisions, they argued, should be written into the bill
to cover anyone who might refuse service, claiming conscientious objection.”).
55

56 Volunteer Armed Forces and Selective Service, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Volunteer Armed Service, 92nd Cong. 83 (1972).
57

Id.

58 Selective Service and Amnesty, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Admin. Prac. & Proc. of
the Sen. Jud. Comm., 92nd Cong. 509 (1972) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Bela A. Silard,
Chairman, Comm. on Conscientious Objection & Draft of the Amer. Ethical Union).
59

Id. at 509–10.

60

Timothy G. Todd, Religious and Conscientious Objection, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1734, 1735
(1969).
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the provisions of the present statute are more generous [than
previous exemptions] for they take into account the characteristics
of a skeptical generation and make the existence of a conscientious
scruple against war in any form, rather than allegiance to a definite
religious group or creed, the basis of exemption.61
The Kauten court then asserted that a definition of religion “is incapable of
compression into a few words,” and that any objection to war based on the guidance
of “an inward mentor, call it conscience or God” could be “the basis of exemption
under the Act.”62
The Ninth Circuit, however, reached a different conclusion. In Berman v. United
States, the Ninth Circuit resorted to the Webster’s dictionary in defining religion as
“[a]n apprehension, awareness, or conviction of the existence of a supreme being.”63
The court then rejected the appellant’s claim for an exemption based on his socialist
convictions, holding that “philosophy and morals and social policy without the
concept of deity cannot be said to be religion in the sense of that term as it is used in
the statute.”64

F. Everson and Religious Exemptions
Between the end of WWII and the beginning of the Korean War, the Supreme
Court decided, for the first time in its history,65 an Establishment Clause case
(Reynolds technically involved a Free Exercise claim66). That 1947 case, Everson v.
Board of Education, relied heavily on Reynolds in holding that the First Amendment,
as incorporated by the Fourteenth, is essentially a federal version of the Virginia
Statute of Freedom.67 The case had profound ramifications for religion-based68 CO
exemptions, as the following passage shows:

61

United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943).

62

Id.

63

Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1946).

64

Id. at 384.

65

BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 663
(1968) (stating that Everson “was, chronologically speaking, the first Establishment Clause case
decided by the high bench”).
66 Though Reynolds is a Free Exercise case, the Everson Court recognized “the interrelation
of these complementary clauses” and held that “[t]here is every reason to give the same
application and broad interpretation [of the ‘free exercise’ clause in Reynolds] to the
‘establishment of religion’ clause.” Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
67

Id. at 29.

68 Arguably, Everson also renders a secular CO exemption unconstitutional. As discussed
earlier, Reynolds defined religion simply as “moral opinion,” and Everson cited that Free
Exercise case in asserting that “[t]here is every reason to give the same application and broad
interpretation to the ‘establishment of religion’ clause.” Id. at 15. One can imagine how
exemptions based on “moral opinion” could present a major hazard to the democratic system:
Congress could, for example, hand out legal exemptions or benefits based on a citizen’s view
about a morally-charged but not necessarily religious issue (such as abortion or same-sex
marriage) that divides the public along partisan lines.
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The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force
nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance . . . . In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect “a wall of
separation between church and State.”69
CO exemptions tailored to peace churches clearly “aid one religion, . . . or prefer
one religion over another,” and even a broader exemption based on personal religious
belief rather than membership in a pacifist denomination would “aid all religions.”70
During the Vietnam War era, courts recognized that CO exemptions could “influence
a person to go to”71 peace churches, and expressed concern that “religious
‘conversions’ of convenience” could occur on such a mass scale that it “might well
upset the orderly administration of the selective service system.” 72 Catholics were
“punished for . . . professing religious beliefs” about “just wars” (because the
exemption required opposition to all wars),73 atheists were punished for “disbelief” in
a Supreme Being,74 members of mainstream denominations were punished for “church
attendance” at non-peace churches,75 and religious non-conformists were punished for
“non-attendance” of any church.76

G. Korean War Draft Law
When Congress began debating legislation to reinstate the draft in anticipation of
war in Korea, the peace churches again lobbied for the inclusion of a CO exemption.
Mennonite and Brethren representatives appeared at committee meetings to argue in
69

Id. at 15–16 (emphasis added).

70

Id. at 15.

71

Id.

72

United States v. Taylor, 351 F. 2d 228, 230 (6th Cir. 1965).

73

Everson, 330 U.S. at 15; see also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).

United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166–67 (1965) (the draft board denied the plaintiff’s
claim for lack of belief in a “supreme being”).
74

75 Martha A. Field, Problems of Proof in Conscientious Objector Cases, 120 PA. L. REV. 870,
930 n.261 (1972) (“[S]tudies show that draft boards are most likely to grant claims by members
of pacifist churches, that persons affiliated with other churches are the next most favored group,
and that persons not affiliated with any church have the most difficult time having their claims
sustained. . . . [C]hurch affiliation (and particularly affiliation with traditional peace churches)
is often controlling.”).
76 Henrietta Caroline Milner, Constitutional Rights and Conscientious Objectors: The Status
of Non-Religious Objectors 18–19 (August, 1969) (M.A. thesis, Oklahoma State University)
(“[S]ome boards defined religion to mean an outward expression of church attendance or church
affiliation.”).
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favor of an expansive exemption based on individual conscience, but Congress
showed a “lack of interest” in these proposals.77 Not only was Congress not interested
in broadening the exemption, it actually “sought to foreclose the broader Kauten
interpretation” of conscientious objection.78
In a closed-door session,79 Congress adopted a CO exemption that borrowed the
“religious training and belief” language from the 1940 conscription law, but further
qualified that this meant “an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being, . . .
but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a
merely personal moral code.”80 “The legislative history of the 1948 statute is, for a
number of reasons, rather sparse,”81 but it is clear that Congress designed the CO
exemption to ensure that future court decisions would resemble Berman and not
Kauten. “Congress incorporated [Berman] not only into the legislative history,” as the
Senate report “specifically cit[ed] Berman,”82 “but also in the very words of the Act”83
by closely following the Berman court’s language.
Interestingly, the Senate report concluded its comments on the CO exemption by
stating that “[t]he exemption is viewed as a privilege.” 84 This view is in line with the
historical understanding of the CO exemption,85 and was probably intended to ward
off claims that the statute’s exemption was rooted in a Free Exercise right. But the
statement also seems oblivious to the Everson decision handed down the year before,
and reinforces this Article’s thesis that the CO exemption could be constitutionally
challenged for providing “privileges” (in the Senate’s own words) on the basis of
religion.

H. Part I Conclusion
Leading up to the Vietnam War, it was quite obvious that the CO exemption rested
on constitutionally-shaky grounds. It was clearly a concession carved out for the
benefit of religious groups, as the historic peace churches had to lobby for an
exemption during every draft in U.S. history. Congress’s own description of it as a
“privilege” afforded to believers in a “Supreme Being” demonstrates that it was a “law
respecting an establishment of religion.”

77

Hearing, supra note 58, at 512.

78

Todd, supra note 60, at 1736. See also CURTIS W. TARR, BY THE NUMBERS: THE REFORM
OF THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM 1970–1972 82 (1981) (“[M]embers of both armed services
committees in Congress worried that the concept [of ‘religious training and belief’] might
become loose and thus unenforceable. . . . From testimony given then and later, the committee
members clearly intended to restrict this provision of the law.”).
79

Hearing, supra note 58, at 511.

80

Select Service Act, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604, 613 (1948) (emphasis added).

81

Hearing, supra note 58, at 511.

82

Todd, supra note 60, at 1736 n.21.

83

Jay R. Dingledy, Welsh v. United States: A New Substantive Definition for Conscientious
Objector, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 653, 662 (1971).
84

S. Rep. No. 80-1268, at 14 (1948).

85

See West, supra note 23, at 377 and accompanying text.
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Looking back, however, it is easy to understand why Congress began this habit of
providing a blatantly unconstitutional exemption. When Congress instituted the first
federal draft during the Civil War, there was already a 200-year-old history of
exempting members of peace churches from conscription.86 Congress simply
succumbed to the inertia of tradition, leaving it to the courts to handle any
constitutional problems (as Congress is in the habit of doing). This strategy, however,
would lead to disaster during the Vietnam War.

II.THE CO EXEMPTION AND THE DEMISE OF THE DRAFT DURING THE
VIETNAM WAR
The U.S. entered the Vietnam War with the constitutionality of the CO exemption
unresolved. But rather than strike the unconstitutional exemption down, the U.S.
Supreme Court, in a strange line of cases, broadened the exemption in an effort to save
it. By the end of the war, virtually every draftee, from the most devout of Amishmen
to the most godless of hippies, qualified for the CO exemption.
The Court’s broadening of the CO exemption arguably did what the war itself and
millions of anti-war activists could not do: end the draft. After 1970, when the Court
held that secular anti-war beliefs qualified an individual for the “religious” CO
exemption, the Selective Service System completely broke down, and Congress
abolished the draft soon after. This Part discusses the Court’s two major Vietnam-era
CO exemption cases—United States v. Seeger and United States v. Welsh—and how
they fatally destabilized the draft system.

A. Seeger and the Subsequent Revision of the Draft Law
“In 1965,” despite a steady escalation of conflict in Vietnam, “few people applied
for conscientious objector status.”87 The (arguably) narrow88 1948 exemption was still
in effect, and the 300-year-old status quo of limiting the exemption to members of the
historic peace churches was still being followed. Many draftees who might have been
interested in applying did not do so because they “knew that existing . . . CO criteria
excluded them.”89
But in March of 1965, the 300-year-old tradition of limiting the CO exemption to
peace church members ended abruptly. That month, the Supreme Court issued a
decision in a case brought by Daniel Andrew Seeger, a lapsed Catholic who applied
86 KREHBIEL, supra note 46, at 62–63 (stating that the first CO exemptions date back to 1663
in the Massachusetts and Rhode Island colonies).
87 Robert A. Seeley, Vietnam: The War We Cannot Escape, A FURTHER FLIGHT,
www.givewings.com/writings/essays_on_war/vietnam.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).
88

Curtis W. Tarr, Selective Service and Conscientious Objectors, 57 A.B.A. J. 976, 978
(1971) (noting that General Hershey, the Director of the Selective Service System, expressed
concern to the House Committee on Armed Services that the wording of 1948 exemption “might
prove the intent of Congress to restrict the provisions of the act,” but “might also be interpreted
as an intent further to broaden the act”).
89

U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY BOARD, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 37 (1975).
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for a CO exemption based on his secular moral values.90 The draft board had denied
Seeger’s application for exemption “because his conscientious objections were not
dependent upon ‘a belief in a relation to a Supreme Being’” as required by the 1948
statute.91
Seeger appealed the draft board’s decision, arguing that a CO exemption based on
“religious training and belief” in a “Supreme Being” violated the Establishment
Clause. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals—the same circuit that issued the Kauten
ruling—agreed with Seeger and held that the “Supreme Being” limitation was
unconstitutional.92 In a conclusion that reflects the argument that Vietnam was a hot
battlefront in a Cold War against communism, the Second Circuit held:
[T]he Supreme Court [has] acknowledged that “[w]e are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.” Our
disposition of this appeal is in keeping with this declaration. It has
often been noted that the principal distinction between the free
world and the Marxist nations is traceable to democracy’s concern
for the rights of the individual citizen, as opposed to the collective
mass of society. And this dedication to the freedom of the
individual, of which our Bill of Rights is the most eloquent
expression, is in large measure the result of the nation’s religious
heritage. Indeed, we here respect the right of Daniel Seeger to
believe what he will largely because of the conviction that every
individual is a child of God; and that Man, created in the image of
his Maker, is endowed for that reason with human dignity.93
The U.S. government appealed the Second Circuit’s ruling to the Supreme Court.
“[T]he fact that Congress chose to draw the line of exemption on the basis of religious
belief confronted the Court with a difficult constitutional question.”94 It would be
tough for the Court to reconcile an exemption limited to monotheistic believers with
Everson, and it might not be able to reconcile any conscience-based exemption with
Reynolds.95
The Court ultimately decided to avoid the “difficult constitutional question” 96 by
granting Seeger a CO exemption on statutory grounds, rendering his constitutional

90

United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 169 (1965).

91

United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 847 (2d Cir. 1964).

92

Id. at 854.

93

Id. at 854–55.

94

CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

AND INTERPRETATION: ANALYSIS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE
STATES TO JUNE 28, 2012, S. DOC. NO. 112-9, at 1100 (2013).
95

See supra note 42.

96 118 CONG. REC. 13, 176 (1972) (statement of Rep. Dellums) (“The Seeger case did not
reach the constitutional question of whether the state might require a belief in God as a condition
for exemption.”).
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challenge moot.97 Applying the doctrine of “constitutional avoidance,”98 in which a
court may go “to extremes to construe an Act of Congress to save it from demise on
constitutional grounds,”99 the Court held that Seeger, who expressly “[r]efus[ed] to
assert a simple belief or disbelief in a deity” and “reject[ed] dependence upon [a]
Creator for a guide to morality,”100 actually satisfied the requirements of the statute. 101
In doing so, “the Court chose to avoid [the Establishment Clause challenge] by a
somewhat disingenuous interpretation of the statute.”102
The Court first held that by “using the expression ‘Supreme Being,’ rather than the
designation ‘God,’” Congress was showing its intent to “embrace all religions and to
exclude essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views.” 103 But since
Seeger’s views on war were philosophical rather than religious, the Court went on to
blur the line between the religious and the secular. The Court, which routinely wields
the “tool of language” in dealing with “fundamental104 questions of man’s predicament
in life,105 in death,106 [and] in final judgment107 and retribution,”108 held that it could
not interpret the meaning of “Supreme Being” with precision because “in no field of
human endeavor has the tool of language proved so inadequate in the communication
of ideas as it has in dealing with the fundamental questions of man’s predicament in
life, in death or in final judgment and retribution.”109
The Court then defined religion in a way that is pure Sixties. Focusing heavily on
Eastern spirituality, the Court held that religion could be thought of as “a way of life
envisioning . . . the day when all men can live together in perfect understanding and
peace,” and that the “Supreme Being” could be conceived as “the transcendental
reality which is truth, knowledge and bliss.”110 In an astounding display of historical
revisionism, the Court asserted that Congress intended this to be a broadly applicable
97

Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185–86.

98 The doctrine was first elaborated by Justice Brandeis in his concurrence to Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), which noted
the “[t]he Court will not pass upon a constitutional question, although properly presented by the
record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”
99

Seeger, 380 U.S. at 189 (Douglas, J., concurring).

100

United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 848 (2d Cir. 1964).

101

Seeger, 380 U.S. at 188.

102

CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 94, at 1054.

103

Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165.

104

The Supreme Court is a constitutional court, and as such it confronts the most
“fundamental” questions of law.
105 The Court hears cases concerning virtually every stage and aspect of human life, from
conception to death.
106

The Court hears cases concerning the death penalty.

107

The Supreme Court is, of course, the court of “last resort.”

108

The Court hears cases concerning the criminal law, which is partially retributive in nature.

109

United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174 (1965).

110

Id. at 174–75.
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exemption because that would be in “keeping with its long established policy of not
picking and choosing among religious beliefs,”111 ignoring the 300-year-long tradition
of limiting the CO exemption to members of historic peace churches.112
Though Seeger himself was not a hippie, the Seeger Court’s language could not
have been more conducive to the counterculture. Suddenly, anyone who held even the
haziest notions of spirituality could claim an exemption that previously had been
limited to small, insular, deeply-conservative sects. Perhaps even a psychedelic vision
of peace sign during an acid trip,113 the “mellow feelings of warmth and safety”
experienced after popping a “love drug,”114 or the “consciousness-raising” powers of
marijuana115 could provide a basis for draft exemption, as some law professors quite
persuasively asserted at the time.116
The anti-war movement quickly seized on the decision as a strategy for draft
resistance. The Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors (“CCCO”), which was
a support organization for secular COs,117 encouraged draftees to “take full advantage
of the opportunity to qualify which the Court has given them.” 118 They emphasized to
atheistic CO applicants that “atheism was not at issue in the Seeger case, for Seeger
had left the Supreme Being question unanswered,” and that they might still qualify if
they “state affirmatively what they believe rather than what they do not.” 119
For the military brass, the decision could not have come at a more inopportune
time. Curtis Tarr, a director of the Selective Service during the Vietnam War,
explained as follows:
Shock waves followed, thundering throughout Selective Service
and in the armed services committees as well. The decision, handed
down on March 8, 1965, came just a few months before President
Johnson made his ominous pledge to send 50,000 men to Vietnam.
[Draft c]alls increased, as did protests to the draft.120
The Selective Service was particularly concerned about dealing with additional
administrative burdens as a result of Seeger. “A 1966-67 advisory panel headed by
111

Id. at 175.

112

Id. at 188.

113 NEIL HAMILTON, DICTIONARY OF 1960S COUNTERCULTURE IN AMERICA (ABC-CLIO
COMPANION) 87 (1997) (noting the role that LSD played in the ambitions of hippies to “create
a self-sufficient settlement around psychedelic visions of peace and love” in Haight-Ashbury).
114 PHILIP JENKINS, SYNTHETIC PANICS: THE SYMBOLIC POLITICS
(1999).

OF

DESIGNER DRUGS 87

115 ROBERT ROSKIND, MEMOIRS OF AN EX-HIPPIE: SEVEN YEARS IN THE COUNTERCULTURE 74
(2004).
116

See generally Joel Jay Finer, Psychedelics and Religious Freedom, 19 HASTINGS L. J. 667
(1968).
117 SCOTT H. BENNETT, RADICAL PACIFISM: THE WAR RESISTERS LEAGUE
NONVIOLENCE IN AMERICA, 1915-1963 145 (2003).

AND

GANDHIAN

118

J. BARTON HARRISON ET AL., HANDBOOK FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS 39 (1968).

119

Id.

120

TARR, supra note 78, at 83.
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General Mark W. Clark warned that Seeger would generate ‘an ever-increasing
number of unjustified appeals for exemption from military service.’”121 These fears
were well-founded, as appeals of draft classifications rose from 4 per 1,000 in 1965
(the year Seeger was decided) to 102 per 1,000 in 1969.122
The Selective Service apparently decided that the best strategy was to not call
attention to the Seeger decision. Former Director Tarr noted in a memoir that the
Selective Service “never had published instructions to its boards following the
landmark ruling in 1965.”123 In addition, the “Selective Service provided quite literally
no information to registrants on . . . conscientious objection,” 124 and President Ford’s
clemency board discovered a decade later that many potential COs did not file an
application because they were uninformed about Seeger.125 Some applicants even
“claimed that they had been discouraged from applying.”126
Despite the Selective Service’s reluctance to implement the decision, “Seeger led
to a major increase in the number of CO applications.”127 In 1966, the first full year
that the Seeger decision was in effect, the ratio of CO exemptions to actual inductions
rose to an astounding 40 times higher than it was during WWII. 128
In 1967, Congress debated how to amend the CO exemption in response to Seeger
and, as one congressman put it, “go[] back to the oldtime religion.” 129 The military
advised Congress that, against the background of that Supreme Court decision,
removing the Supreme Being clause would have to be clearly recognized as
Congressional intent to narrow the standard.130 Congress followed the military’s
advice and removed the “Supreme Being” language while leaving the “religious
training and belief” requirement.131

B. Welsh and the Collapse of the Selective Service System
In 1970, the Supreme Court again returned to the CO exemption issue in United
States v. Welsh. The Welsh Court noted that the “controlling facts in this case are
strikingly similar to those in Seeger,” with the main difference being that “Welsh could
sign [the CO exemption form] only after striking the words ‘my religious training,’”

121

Tarr, supra note 88, at 977.

122

Seeley, supra note 87, at 4.

123

TARR, supra note 78, at 85.

124

Seeley, supra note 87, at 4.

125

U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY BOARD, supra note 89, at 38.

126

Id.

127

Seeley, supra note 87, at 4.

128

Chambers, supra note 6, at 42.

129

Extension of the Universal Military Training and Service Act: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Armed Services, H.R. Rep. No. 12, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
130

Tarr, supra note 88, at 978.

131

Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3801-3820 (1967).
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while Seeger’s case turned on his lack of belief in a “Supreme Being.”132 Welsh,
therefore, was a perfect test case for the 1967 revision to the CO exemption.
Like Seeger, Welsh asserted that the religious component of the CO exemption
violated the Establishment Clause. And like it did in Seeger, the Court applied the
“constitutional avoidance” doctrine in Welsh to avoid confronting the Establishment
Clause claim. “Knowing the intent of Congress when it enacted the 1967
amendments,” Selective Service Director Tarr explained, “the Court still preferred to
interpret ‘religious training’ broadly rather than to discard the entire section of the law
as defective under the First Amendment.”133
The Welsh Court held that “[i]f an individual deeply and sincerely holds [anti-war]
beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content,” those beliefs qualify as
“religious” under the statute, even though the statute explicitly stated that “religious
belief . . . does not include . . . a merely personal moral code.”134 Though the Court
recognized that “Welsh was far more insistent and explicit than Seeger in denying that
his views were religious,” it dismissed his characterizations of his own beliefs as
irrelevant because “very few registrants are fully aware of the broad scope of the word
‘religious.’”135 The Court concluded by essentially writing a secular morals and ethics
exemption into the statute, holding that it “exempts from military service all those
whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs,” have
led them to pacifism.136
It is hard to tell why the Court chose to ignore Congress’s obvious intentions and
adopt such an implausible interpretation of the statute. Though “the words of a statute
may be strained ‘in the candid service of avoiding a serious constitutional doubt’”137
under the “constitutional avoidance” doctrine, the Welsh Court went far beyond
“strain[ing]” the statute’s language and directly contradicted the statute’s plain text. 138
The Welsh interpretation—that the statute defines atheism as religion, and that an
“individual[’s] deeply and sincerely h[e]ld . . . beliefs” do not constitute a “merely
personal moral code”—is simply too far-fetched to believe. In his concurrence, Justice
Harlan described the majority opinion as being a product of an “Alice-in-Wonderland
world where words have no meaning.”139
The most likely explanation is that the Court was reluctant to overturn a 300-yearold exemption by judicial fiat, as this could undermine confidence in the rule of law.140
132

Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 338 (1970).

133

Tarr, supra note 88, at 979.

134

Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340.

135

Id. at 341.

136

Id. at 340–44 (emphasis added).

137

United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 188 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring).

See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 345 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he liberties taken with the statute
. . . cannot be justified in the name of the familiar doctrine of construing federal statutes in a
manner that will avoid possible constitutional infirmities in them. There are limits to the
permissible application of that doctrine, and . . . those limits were crossed.”).
138

139

Id. at 354.

140

The Court is a deeply conservative institution, as many of its doctrines (such as stare
decisis) seek to preserve the status quo. Even supposedly “progressive” decisions, such as Roe
v. Wade and Obergefell v. Hodges, are couched as preserving time-tested practices and
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It may have been trying to signal to Congress that the exemption was unconstitutional,
as concurring justices in both Seeger141 and Welsh142 spelled out. The Court may have
been trying to force Congress to abolish the exemption itself, thus taking care of the
constitutional problem in a democratic fashion.
If that was indeed the Court’s strategy, Congress did not take the bait. The
exemption stayed on the books, and vast numbers of draftees took advantage. “In the
first month after Welsh, Selective Service received 100,000 applications for CO
status,”143 which rivaled the number of CO exemptions issued over the previous five
years.144
CO applicants who had their applications denied after Welsh were (quite
reasonably) far more likely to appeal. “By 1971, the number of appeals had far
outstripped the Selective Service’s ability to process them. The system was on the
verge of breakdown from the sheer weight of perfectly legal paperwork.” 145
Welsh also provided draft law violators with a silver-bullet defense. In 1970, the
first year that the Welsh ruling was available as a defense, acquittals of defendants
charged with Selective Service Acts violations outnumbered convictions for the first
time in the Vietnam War era.146 Acquittals would continue to outnumber convictions
until the draft was abolished.147
Perhaps the most astounding statistical evidence of Welsh’s impact is the ratio of
CO exemptions to actual inductions into the military. In 1972, after the Selective
Service issued revised CO exemption guidelines to draft boards that incorporated
Welsh, “more registrants were classified as COs than were inducted into the army.”148
To say that “[s]uch a phenomenon was unprecedented in American history” would be

principles. Roe, for example, went to extraordinary lengths to show that the West has historically
permitted abortion, with a historical review that reached all the way back to the Achaemenid
Empire. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130 (1973). Obergefell took pains to demonstrate that
same-sex marriage was consistent with “essential attributes of th[e] right [to marry] based in
history [and] tradition.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
141 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 188 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“If I read the statute differently from
the Court, I would have difficulties. For then those who embraced one religious faith rather than
another would be subject to penalties; and that kind of discrimination, as we held in Sherbert v.
Verner, would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.”).
142 Welsh, 398 U.S. at 356 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[H]aving chosen to exempt, [Congress]
cannot draw the line between theistic or nontheistic religious beliefs on the one hand and secular
beliefs on the other. Any such distinctions are not, in my view, compatible with the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”).
143

Seeley, supra note 87, at 4.

144 Chambers, supra note 6, at 42 (stating that there were 170,000 CO exemptions issued
between 1965-1970).
145

Seeley, supra note 87, at 4.

146

ROSS GREGORY, COLD WAR AMERICA, 1946 TO 1990 277 (2014).

147

Id.

148

Chambers, supra note 6, at 42.
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an understatement, as there were only 1.5 exemptions per thousand inductees during
WWI and WWII.149
After Welsh, “[t]he draft had, for all practical purposes, broken down.” 150 Robert
A. Seeley, the executive director of CCCO during the Vietnam War, asserted that
Seeger and especially Welsh “[a]rguably . . . broke the back of the draft.”151 In January
1973, two and a half years after Welsh was handed down, the draft was abolished.152

C. Part II Conclusion
The Court’s broadening of the CO exemption, and Congress’s failure to follow up
by revoking the exemption, clearly played a major role in the abolition of the Selective
Service System, and possibly even the U.S. pullout from Vietnam two months later.
If Seeger had not breathed life into the draft resistance movement in 1965, and if Welsh
had not strained the Selective Service to the breaking point in the early 1970s, it is
possible that the war might have plodded on even longer than it did, and it is also
possible that the draft system might have emerged from Vietnam intact.

III. WELSH AND THE POST-VIETNAM MILITARY
Even after the end of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, Welsh would deliver one final
blow to the draft. After the U.S. pulled out of Vietnam, the conversation turned to
what to do about draft evaders, many of whom were living abroad to avoid
prosecution. Some began arguing that “[t]hose moral and ethical pacifists who went
into exile or were convicted for refusing to submit to induction prior to 1970,” when
Welsh was handed down, “should certainly receive amnesty.” 153
In 1974, President Ford announced a controversial conditional amnesty program
for draft evaders.154 A clemency board system was established to determine if draft
law violators were eligible to receive a presidential pardon.155 The clemency boards
would go on to cite Welsh in liberally offering pardon to violators who cited
conscience as their motive for evading the draft.156
In a report written for the president one year after the program was instituted, the
Presidential Clemency Board highlighted the major role Welsh was playing as a
“Mitigating Factor” in clemency cases.157 The Board reported that nearly half of draft
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law violators cited ethical oppositions to war as at least a partial motive for evading
the draft, and that 90% of violations occurred before Welsh was decided.158 “Although
the court decision was not retroactive,” the Board reported, “we felt it only fair to give
credit to applicants who received convictions simply because they were brought to
trial before Welsh.”159
With Ford’s clemency program having established a precedent for granting
amnesty for draft evaders, President Carter would eventually issue a blanket pardon
for all Vietnam draft violations in 1977.160 Though the nation as a whole was ready to
move on at that point, the pardon of “draft dodgers” was understandably unpopular
with Vietnam veterans.161 Why, after all, should they have suffered through the horrors
of the war when they could have defied their draft orders and later received a pardon?
After the mass amnesty for draft violations, it is very difficult to imagine the draft
being reinstated. What little institutional credibility the draft had left after Vietnam
was likely lost as a result of the presidential pardons. As one of the major justifications
for amnesty, Welsh helped steer the U.S. down an irrevocable course towards a
permanently all-volunteer military.

IV. CONCLUSION
In a haunting echo of Rep. Scott’s 1789 prophesy,162 former Selective Service
director Tarr predicted that, with the breakdown of established religion and the rise of
individualistic moral development, it will be impossible to separate sincere
conscientious objectors from the opportunistic:
I cannot imagine conscientious objection becoming easier to define
in the future. Although traditional beliefs in God are less widely
accepted, more young people worry about the problems of
conscience. Boards, even those composed of professional people,
would have difficulty determining who really passes the tests
handed down thus far by the courts.163
Faced with this impossible task, if the U.S. government ever wishes to reinstate
the draft while avoiding a repeat of the post-Welsh mass exemptions, it will have to
completely abolish the CO exemption.
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